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Abstract
Privacy-preserving releasing of complex data (e.g., image, text, au-
dio) represents a long-standing challenge for the data mining re-
search community. Due to rich semantics of the data and lack of a
priori knowledge about the analysis task, excessive sanitization is
often necessary to ensure privacy, leading to significant loss of the
data utility. In this paper, we present dp-GAN, a general private
releasing framework for semantic-rich data. Instead of sanitizing
and then releasing the data, the data curator publishes a deep gen-
erative model which is trained using the original data in a differ-
entially private manner; with the generative model, the analyst is
able to produce an unlimited amount of synthetic data for arbitrary
analysis tasks. In contrast of alternative solutions, dp-GAN high-
lights a set of key features: (i) it provides theoretical privacy guar-
antee via enforcing the differential privacy principle; (ii) it retains
desirable utility in the released model, enabling a variety of oth-
erwise impossible analyses; and (iii) most importantly, it achieves
practical training scalability and stability by employing multi-fold
optimization strategies. Through extensive empirical evaluation
on benchmark datasets and analyses, we validate the efficacy of
dp-GAN.
(The source code and the data used in the paper is available at:
https://github.com/alps-lab/dpgan)
1 INTRODUCTION
With the continued advances in mobile computing and the surg-
ing popularity of social media, a massive amount of semantic-rich
data (e.g., image, text, audio) about individuals is being collected.
While analyzing and understanding such data entails tremendous
commercial value (e.g., targeted advertisements and personalized
recommendations), governments and organizations all have rec-
ognized the critical need of respecting individual privacy in such
practice [36]. In general, privacy protection can be enforced in two
settings. In the interactive setting, a trusted curator collects data
from individuals and provides a privacy-preserving interface for
the analyst to execute queries over the data; in the more challeng-
ing non-interactive setting, the curator releases a “sanitized” ver-
sion of the data, simultaneously providing analysis utility for the
analyst and privacy protection for the individuals represented in
the data [10].
Hitherto, privacy-preserving releasing of semantic-rich data still
represents a long-standing challenge for the privacy and security
research communities: the rich semantics of such data enable a
wide variety of potential analyses, while the concrete analyses are
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Figure 1: High-level design of dp-GAN, a privacy-preserving
releasing framework for semantic-rich data.
often unknown ahead of releasing, especially in the case of ex-
ploratorydata analysis. Therefore, to ensure privacy, excessive san-
itization is often necessary, whichmay completely destroy the data
utility for potential analyses.
In this paper,we tackle this challenge by integrating the state-of-
the-art deep learning methods with advanced privacy-preserving
mechanism. Specifically, we present dp-GAN, a new private releas-
ing framework for semantic-rich data. With dp-GAN, instead of
releasing a sanitized version of the original data, the curator pub-
lishes a generativemodel (i.e., generative adversarial network [15]),
which is trained using the original data in a privacy-preserving
manner. The analyst, once equipped with this generative model, is
able to produce synthetic data for the intended analysis tasks. The
high-level framework of dp-GAN is illustrated in Figure 1.
In comparison with alternative solutions (e.g., sanitizing and
then releasing the data), dp-GAN highlights with a number of sig-
nificant advantages. First, it enforces differential privacy [8], the
state-of-the-art privacy principle, in the training of generative mod-
els. Due to its closure under post-processing property [10], differ-
ential privacy ensures that the released model provides theoreti-
cally guaranteed privacy protection for the training data. Second,
the use of generative models (e.g., generative adversarial networks
in particular) as the vehicles of data releasing enables the synthe-
sized data to capture the rich semantics of the original data. The
faithful preservation of desirable utility leads to a variety of other-
wise impossible analyses. For example, we show empirically that
dp-GAN is able to effectively support semi-supervised classifica-
tion tasks. Finally, the generative model is able to produce an un-
limited amount of synthetic data for arbitrary analysis tasks, as
shown in Figure 1.
However, realizing dp-GAN entails two major challenges. First,
it requires new algorithmic advances to implement differential pri-
vacy within generative model training. To this end, we extend the
framework of Improved Wasserstein GAN [16] by integrating the
state-of-the-art privacy enhancing mechanisms (e.g., Gaussianmech-
anism [10]) and provide refined analysis of privacy loss within this
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Figure 2: Illustration of generative adversarial networks.
framework. Second, the stability and scalability issues of training
GANmodels are even more evident once privacy enhancing mech-
anisms are incorporated. To this end, we develop multi-fold opti-
mization strategies, including weight clustering, adaptive clipping,
and warm starting, which significantly improve both training sta-
bility and utility retention. Our contributions can be summarized
as follows.
• First, to our best knowledge, dp-GAN is the firstworking frame-
work that realizes the paradigm of privacy-preserving model
releasing for semantic-rich data.We believe this new paradigm
is applicable for a broad range of privacy-sensitive data pub-
lishing applications.
• Second, in implementing dp-GAN, we develop multi-fold sys-
tem optimization strategies that not only successfully incorpo-
rate privacy enhancing mechanisms within training deep gen-
erative model, but also significantly improve the stability and
scalability of generative model training itself.
• Third, we conduct extensive empirical evaluation using real
large-size image data to validate the efficacy of dp-GAN. We
show that dp-GAN, besides providing theoretically guaranteed
privacy protection, preserves desirable utility of the original
data, enabling a set of otherwise impossible analysis tasks.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 re-
views the background of deep generative models and differential
privacy; Section 3 presents the high-level design of dp-GAN; Sec-
tion 4 details its implementation, in particular, the multi-fold opti-
mizations to improve the stability and scalability of model training;
Section 5 empirically evaluates our proposed solution; Section 6
discusses additional relevant literature; The paper is concluded in
Section 7.
2 PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we introduce the two basic building blocks of dp-
GAN, generative adversarial network and differential privacy.
2.1 Generative Adversarial Network
The generative adversarial network (GAN) [15] is a class of unsu-
pervised learning algorithms which are implemented by an adver-
sarial process. As illustrated in Figure 2, the GAN architecture typi-
cally comprises two neural networks, a generatorG and a discrim-
inator D, in which G learns to map from a latent distribution pz
to the true data distribution pdata, while D discriminates between
instances sampled from pdata and that generated by G. Here G’s
objective is to “fool” D by synthesizing instances that appear to
have come from pdata. This framework corresponds to solving a
minimax two-player game with the following objective function:
min
θ
max
w
Ex∼pdata [logDw (x)] + Ez∼pz [log(1 − Dw (Gθ (z)))] (1)
where x and z are sampled from pdata and pz respectively.
Since its advent, GAN finds applications in varied unsupervised
and semi-supervised learning tasks [6, 7, 22, 23, 28–30, 39]. One
line of work takes the trained discriminator as a feature extractor
and applies it in varied settings; the other line focuses on the latent
variable z in the generator, either using regularization to make z
semantically meaningful [6, 7] or extracting information in the la-
tent space directly [28].
Despite its simplicity, the original GAN formulation is unstable
and inefficient to train. A number of followupwork [2, 6, 16, 26, 28,
41] propose new training procedures and network architectures
to improve training stability and convergence rate. In particular,
the Wasserstein generative adversarial network (WGAN) [2] and
Improved Training of Wasserstein GANs [16] attempt to minimize
the earth mover distance between the synthesized distribution and
the true distribution rather than their Jensen-Shannon divergence
as in the original GAN formulation. Formally, improved WGAN
adopts the following objective functions:
argmin
w
−Dw (Gθ (z)) (2)
argmin
θ
Dw (Gθ (z)) − Dw (x) + λ
(‖∇xˆDw (xˆ)‖2 − 1
)2
(3)
Here, xˆ = αx + (1 − α)Gθ (z), in which α is a random number
sampled from [0, 1]. The regularization term enforces the norm of
D’s gradients to be close to 1. This formulation is shown to allow
more stable and faster training [16].
In the following, without loss of generality, we will exemplify
with the improved WGAN formulation to implement dp-GAN.
2.2 Differential Privacy
By providing theoretically guaranteed protection, differential pri-
vacy (DP) [8–10] is considered one of the strongest privacy defini-
tions.
Definitions. We say a randomized mechanism M : Dn 7→ R
satisfies ϵ-DP if for any adjacent databases d,d ′ ∈ Dn (which are
identical except for one single data entry) and any subset R ⊆ R ,
it holds that Pr[M(d) ∈ R] ≤ eϵPr[M(d ′) ∈ R]. A relaxed version,
(ϵ, δ )-DP, allows the plain ϵ-DP to be compromised with a small
probability δ : Pr[M(d) ∈ R] ≤ eϵPr[M(d ′) ∈ R] + δ . In this work,
we consider (ϵ, δ )-DP as the default privacy definition.
Mechanisms. For a given deterministic function f , DP is of-
ten achieved by injecting random noise into f ’s output, while the
noise magnitude is determined by f ’s sensitivity. If f is vector-
valued, i.e., f : Dn 7→ Rm , its sensitivity is defined as: ∆f =
maxd,d ′ ‖ f (d) − f (d ′)‖, where ∆f represents the maximum influ-
ence of a single data entry on f ’s output, quantifying the (worst-
case) uncertainty to be added to f ’s output to hide the presence of
that entry.
If f ’s sensitivity is defined using ℓ2 norm, the Gaussian mecha-
nism [10] is a common choice for randomizing f ’s output:
M(d) = f (d) +N(0, (∆f )2σI),
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where N(0, (∆f )2σI) is a Gaussian distribution with zero mean
and covariance matrix (∆f )2σI and I is the identity matrix.
Properties. In addition, DP also features the following key prop-
erties, which we leverage in implementing dp-GAN.
• Closure under post-processing. Any computation on the output
of a DP-mechanism does not increase privacy loss.
• Sequential composability. The composition of a sequence of DP-
mechanisms is also DP-satisfying.
We may use the composition theorems [10, 11] to estimate the pri-
vacy loss after k-fold application of DP-mechanisms.
3 MODELS AND ALGORITHMS
In this section, we present the basic design of dp-GAN, a generic
framework for differentially private releasing of semantic-rich data.
3.1 Overview
Similar to the line of work on differentially private deep learning
(e.g., [1]), dp-GAN achieves DP by injecting random noise in the
optimization procedure (e.g., stochastic gradient descent [33]). Yet,
the GAN architecture, which comprises a generator G and a dis-
criminator D, presents unique challenges for realizing this idea.
A naïve solution is to inject noise in training both G and D; the
minimax game formulation however makes it difficult to tightly
estimate the privacy loss, resulting in excessive degradation in the
produced models.
We opt to add random perturbation only in training D. The ra-
tionale behind our design choice is as follows. First, as shown in
Figure 2, the real data is directly accessible only by D; thus, it suf-
fices to control the privacy loss in training D. Second, in compar-
ison with G, which often employs building blocks such as batch
normalizations [19] and residual layers [17, 18] in order to gener-
ate realistic samples, D often features a simpler architecture and
a smaller number of parameters, which make it possible to tightly
estimate the privacy loss.
After deciding where to enforce privacy protection, next we
present the basic construct of dp-GAN, as sketched in Algorithm 1.
At a high level, dp-GAN is built upon the improved WGAN frame-
work and enforces DP by injecting random noise in updating the
discriminator D. Specifically, when computing D’s gradients with
respect to a real sample x (line 7), we first clip the gradients by
a threshold C (line 8), ensuring that the sensitivity is bounded by
C ; we then add random noise sampled from a Gaussian distribu-
tion. Additionally, we use a privacy accountant A similar to [24]
to track the cumulative privacy loss. This process iterates until con-
vergence or exceeding the privacy budget (line 14).
3.2 Privacy Analysis
A key component of dp-GAN is to keep track the cumulative pri-
vacy loss during the course of training, i.e., privacy accountantA,
which integrates two building blocks: moments accounting and
sub-sampling. Next we elaborate on each component.
Moments Accounting. In [1], Abadi et al. propose moments
accounting, a privacy accounting method, which provides tighter
estimation of the privacy loss than the composition theorems. Specif-
ically, consider the privacy loss as a random variable Z , which is
Algorithm 1: Basic dp-GAN
Input: n - number of samples; λ - coefficient of gradient
penalty; ncritic - number of critic iterations per
generator iteration; nparam - number of
discriminator’s parameters;m - batch size; (α , β1, β2) -
Adam hyper-parameters; C - gradient clipping bound;
σ - noise scale; (ϵ0 , δ0) - total privacy budget
Output: differentially private generator G
1 while θ has not converge do
2 for t = 1, · · · ,ncritic do
3 for i = 1, · · · ,m do
4 sample x ∼ pdata, z ∼ pz , ρ ∼ U [0, 1] ;
5 xˆ ← ρx + (1 − ρ)G(z) ;
6 ℓ(i ) ← D(G(z)) − D(x) + λ (‖▽xˆD(xˆ)‖2 − 1
)2
;
// computing discriminator’s gradients
7 д(i ) ← ▽w ℓ(i );
// clipping and perturbation
(ξ ∼ N (0, (σC)2 I))
8 д(i ) ← д(i )/max(1, | |д(i ) | |2/C) + ξ ;
// updating privacy accountant
9 updateA with (σ ,m,nparam) ;
// updating discriminator
10 w ← Adam
(
1
m
∑m
i=1 д
(i ),w,α , β1, β2
)
;
11 sample {z(i )}mi=1 ∼ pz ;
// updating generator
12 θ ← Adam
(
∇θ 1m
∑m
i=1 −D(G(z(i ))),θ, α , β1, β2
)
;
// computing cumulative privacy loss
13 δ ← query A with ϵ0;
14 if δ > δ0 then break;
15 return G
defined as:
Z (o;M,d,d ′) = log Pr[M(x) = o]
Pr[M(d ′) = o]
where d,d ′ ∈ Dn are two neighboring datasets,M is the random
mechanism, and o ∈ R is an outcome.
The privacy loss can be estimated by bounding the λ–th mo-
ment of Z , which is calculated via evaluating the moment generat-
ing function of Z at λ:
αM (λ;d,d ′) = logEo∼M(d )
[
exp(λZ (o;M,d,d ′))]
To enforce DP, one needs to consider αM across all possible d,d ′,
i.e., αM , maxd,d ′ αM (λ;d,d ′).
Using Markov’s inequality, it can be proved that for any ϵ > 0,
M satisfies (ϵ, δ )-DP for δ = minλ(αM − λϵ) [1]. Besides, if M
is the composition of a sequence of sub-mechanisms {Mj } Jj=1, it
holds that αM (λ) ≤
∑J
j=1 αMj (λ). In tracking the privacy loss, we
apply numerical integration to compute αM (λ).
Sub-sampling. During each iteration of training D, we sample
a batch of examples from the real dataset (line 4). The randomness
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due to sampling adds another level of privacy protection. Accord-
ing to the privacy amplification theorems [4, 20], this sampling
procedure achieves (O(qϵ,qδ ))-DP per iteration with respect to
the whole dataset where q = m/n is the sampling ratio per batch,
σ =
√
2 log(1.25/δ )/ϵ , and ϵ ≤ 1.
Usingmoments accounting [1], it can be proved that Algorithm1
is (O(qϵ√t), δ )-DP, where t is the total number of iterations in the
main loop, if the noise scale σ and the clipping threshold C are
chosen appropriately.
Theorem 3.1. Algorithm1 is (O(qϵ√t),δ )-DP, where t is the total
number of iterations in the main loop, if the noise scale σ and the
clipping threshold C are chosen appropriately.
Proof: We have the following facts about moments accounting,
Gaussian mechanism, and random sampling [1]:
• (1) LetM be the composition of a sequence of sub-mechanisms
{Mj } Jj=1, it holds that αM (λ) ≤
∑J
j=1 αMj (λ).
• (2) Using Markov’s inequality, we have for any ϵ > 0,M satis-
fies (ϵ, δ )-DP for δ = minλ(αM − λϵ).
• (3) Consider a function f which maps a data sample to a real-
valued vector, with its output bounded by | | f | |2 ≤ 1. Let σ ≥ 1
and I be a set of samples from [n]where each i ∈ I is selected
from [n] independently with probability q ≤ 116σ . Then for
any positive integer λ ≤ −σ2 ln(qσ ), the mechanism M(d) =∑
i ∈I f (di ) +N(0,σ2I) satisfies
αM (λ) ≤
q2λ(λ + 1)
(1 − q)σ2 + O(q
3λ3/σ3)
Assume thatσ and λ satisfy the condition in (3). The log-moment
of Algorithm1 is bounded by α(λ) ≤ q2λ2t/σ2, according to (2)
and (3). To ensure that Algorithm1 satisfies (ϵ¯, δ¯ )-DP, it suffices
to have (i) q2λ2t/σ2 ≤ λϵ¯/2, (ii) exp(−λϵ¯/2) ≤ δ¯2, and (iii) λ ≤
−σ2 log(qσ ).
With easy calculation, it can be verified that there exist two con-
stants c1 and c2, such that when ϵ¯ = c1q
2t and σ = c2q
√
− log δ¯/ϵ¯ ,
all the aforementioned conditions are met. 
4 OPTIMIZATIONS
The GAN formulation is known for its training stability issue [16].
This issue is even more evident in the dp-GAN framework, as ran-
dom noise is injected in each training step. In our empirical study
(Section 5), it is observed that the basic dp-GAN suffers a set of
drawbacks.
• Its synthesized data is often of low quality, e.g., unrealistic look-
ing images.
• It converges slower than its regular GAN counterpart, result-
ing in excessive privacy loss, and sometimes even diverges.
• Its framework is fairly rigid, unable to take advantage of extra
resources, e.g., a small amount of public data.
Here we propose a suite of optimization strategies that signifi-
cantly improve dp-GAN’s training stability and convergence rate.
Specifically, we enhance the basic dp-GAN along three directions.
• Parameter grouping - By carefully grouping the parameters
and perform stratified clipping over different groups, we strike
a balance between convergence rate and privacy cost.
• Adaptive clipping - By monitoring the change of gradient mag-
nitudes, we dynamically adjust the clipping bounds to achieve
faster convergence and stronger privacy.
• Warm starting - By initializing the model with a good start-
ing point, we boost up the convergence and save the privacy
budget for critical iterations.
Next we detail each of these optimization strategies.
4.1 Parameter Grouping
As shown in Algorithm 1, the DP constraint essentially influences
the training in two key operations (line 8): clipping - the norm
of gradients is truncated by an upper bound C , and perturbation -
random noise is added to the gradients. We propose to explore the
opportunities to optimize these two critical operations.
In Algorithm 1, the gradients of all the parameters are grouped
together to compute the norm. This global clipping scheme min-
imizes the privacy budget spent in each iteration, but introduces
excessive random noise for some parameters, causing slow conver-
gence. At the other end of the spectrum, one may clip the gradient
of each parameter with a parameter-specific clipping bound,which
may reduce the overall amount of random noise, but at the cost of
privacy budget. Here we propose two alternative grouping strate-
gies that strike a balance between convergence rate and privacy
loss per iteration.
Weight-Bias Separation. InmostGANarchitectures (e.g., con-
volutional layers and fully connected layers), there are two types
of parameters, weights and biases. For example, a fully connected
layer models a linear function f (x) = w ·x+b wherew andb are the
weight and bias parameters respectively. In our empirical study, it
is observed that the magnitudes of the biases’ gradients are often
close to zero, while the magnitudes of the weights’ gradients are
much larger. Thus, our first strategy is to differentiate weight and
bias parameters and to group the gradients of all the bias param-
eters together for the clipping operation. Given the large number
of bias parameters, under the same amount of overall privacy bud-
get, this strategy almost doubles the allowed number of iterations,
with little influence on the convergence rate (details in Section 5).
Weight Clustering. While it is natural to group the bias pa-
rameters together as many of them are close to zero, the grouping
of the weight parameters is much less obvious. Here we propose a
simple yet effective strategy to stratify and cluster the weight pa-
rameters. Assuming that we have the optimal parameter-specific
clipping bound {c(дi )}i for each weight’s gradient {дi }i (we will
show how to achieve this shortly), we then cluster these parame-
ters into a predefined number of groups using a hierarchical clus-
tering procedure, as sketched in Algorithm 2.
Specifically, starting with each gradient forming its own group
(line 1), we recursively find two groupsG,G ′ with the most similar
clipping bounds andmerge them to form a new group (line 3-4). As
we use ℓ2 norm, the clipping bound of the newly formed group is
computed as
√
c(G)2 + c(G ′)2.
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Algorithm 2:Weight-Clustering
Input: k - targeted number of groups; {c(дi )}i -
parameter-specific gradient clipping bounds
Output: G - grouping of parameters
1 G ← {(дi : c(дi ))}i ;
2 while |G| > k do
3 G,G ′ ← argminG,G′∈G max
(
c(G)
c(G′) ,
c(G′)
c(G)
)
;
4 mergeG and G ′ with clipping bound as
√
c(G)2 + c(G ′)2;
5 return G
4.2 Adaptive Clipping
In Algorithm 1, the gradient clipping boundC is a hyper-parameter
that needs careful tuning. Overly small C amounts to excessive
truncation of the gradients, while overly large C is equivalent to
overestimating the sensitivity, both resulting in slow convergence
and poorutility. However, within the improvedWGAN framework,
it is challenging to find a near-optimal setting of C , due to reasons
including: (i) the magnitudes of the weights and biases and their
gradients vary greatly across different layers; and (ii) the magni-
tudes of the gradients are constantly changing during the training.
To overcome these challenges, we propose to constantly mon-
itor the magnitudes of the gradients before and during the train-
ing, and set the clipping bounds based on the average magnitudes.
Specifically, we assume that besides the private data Dpri to train
the model, we have access to a small amount of public data Dpub
which is available in many settings. During each training step, we
randomly sample a batch of examples fromDpub , and set the clip-
ping bound of each parameter as the average gradient norm with
respect to this batch. In our empirical study (Section 5), we find
that this adaptive clipping strategy leads to much faster training
convergence and higher data utility.
4.3 Warm Starting
It is expected that due to the random noise injected in each training
step, the GANwith the DP constraint often converges slower than
its vanilla counterpart, especially during its initial stage. To boost
up the convergence rate, we propose to leverage the small amount
of public dataDpub to initialize themodel. Specifically, usingDpub ,
we first train a few iterations without the DP constraint, and then
continue the training using Dpri under the DP constraint.
This strategy provides a warm start for dp-GAN. It helps find a
satisfying starting point, which is essential for the model to con-
verge, and also saves a significant amount of privacy budget for
more critical iterations.
An astute reader may point out that since there is public data
available, one may just use the public data for training. The issue
is that the public data is often fairly limited, which may not be
sufficient to train a high-quality GAN. Further, the large amount of
private data is valuable for improving the diversity of the samples
synthesized by the generator (details in Section 5).
4.4 Advanced Algorithm
Putting everything together, Algorithm 3 sketches the enhanced
dp-GAN framework. Different from Algorithm 1, we initialize the
Algorithm 3: Advanced dp-GAN
Input: n - number of samples; Dpub - public dataset; λ -
coefficient of gradient penalty; ncritic - number of
critic iterations per generator’s iteration; nparam -
number of discriminator’s parameters;m - batch size
for training GAN;mpub - batch size for estimating
norms of gradients; (α , β1, β2) - Adam
hyper-parameters; C - gradient clipping bound; σ -
noise scale; (ϵ0, δ0) - overall privacy target; k -
number of parameter groups
Output:G - differentially private generator
// warm starting
1 (w, θ) ← train regular improved WGAN using Dpub ;
2 while θ has not converged do
3 for t = 1, · · · ,ncritic do
// computing gradients of public data
4 sample {x¯i }mpubi=1 ∼ Dpub ;
5 {д¯(i )}mpubi=1 ← Improved WGAN-Gradient ({x¯i }
mpub
i=1 ,
mpub);
// grouping parameters with similar clipping
bounds
6 {(G j , cj )}kj=1 ←Weight-Clustering (k , {д¯(i )}
mpub
i=1 );
// computing gradients of real data
7 sample {xi }mi=1 ∼ pdata ;
8 {д(i )}mi=1 ← Improved WGAN-Gradient ({xi }mi=1,m);
9 for i = 1, · · · ,m do
10 д
(i )
j ← д(i ) ∩G j for j = 1, · · · ,k ;
11 for j = 1, · · · ,k do
// clipping and perturbation
ξ ∼ N(0, (σcj )2I)
12 д
(i )
j ← д
(i )
j /max(1, | |д
(i )
j | |2/cj ) + ξ ;
// updating privacy accountant
13 updateA with (σ ,m,k) ;
// updating discriminator
14 wj ← Adam( 1m
∑m
i=1д
(i )
j ,wj ,α , β1, β2) for
j = 1, · · · ,k ;
15 w ← {wj
}k
j=1;
16 sample {z(i )}mi=1 ∼ pz ;
// updating generator
17 θ ← Adam(∇θ 1m
∑m
i=1 −D(G(z(i ))),θ, α , β1, β2);
// computing cumulative privacy loss
18 δ ← query A with ϵ0;
19 if δ ≥ δ0 then break ;
20 return G;
21 Procedure Improved WGAN-Gradient ({xi }mi=1,m)
22 for i = 1, · · · ,m do
23 sample z ∼ pz , ρ ∼ U[0, 1];
24 xˆ ← ρxi + (1 − ρ)G(z) ;
25 ℓ(i ) ← D(G(z)) − D(xi ) + λ(| |▽xˆD(xˆ)| |2 − 1)2 ;
26 д(i ) ← ▽w ℓ(i );
27 return {д(i )}mi=1;5
model with a warm starting procedure using the public dataDpub
(line 1). During each training iteration, we first estimate the clip-
ping bound of each parameter usingDpub (line 4-5), then group the
parameters into k groups {G j }kj=1, eachG j sharing similar clipping
bound cj (line 6). In our current implementation, we use the aver-
age clipping bounds in G j to estimate cj . We then perform group-
wise clipping and perturbation (line 9-12). The remaining part is
similar to Algorithm 1. The process iterates until the generator’s
parameters converge or the privacy budget is used up (line 19).
Astute readers may raise the concern about possible additional
privacy loss due to the multiple optimization strategies. We have
the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1. Algorithm3 is (O(qϵ√t),δ )-DP, where t is the total
number of iterations in the main loop, if the noise scale σ and the
clipping threshold C are chosen appropriately.
Proof: Algorithm 3 differs from Algorithm 1 mainly in its use of
finer-grained clippings for different groups of parameters, which
however does not cause additional privacy loss. Intuitively, thanks
to the composability property of the moments accounting [1], the
privacy loss due to applying parameter-specific clipping is com-
pletely accounted.
Next we prove that the strategy of weight clustering does not
cause unaccounted privacy loss, while similar arguments apply to
other optimization strategies as well.
In Algorithm1, in the i-th iteration, the gradient д(i ) is first
clipped by a global bound c and the random noise ξ ∼ N(0, (σc)2I)
is applied to д(i ) to ensure (ϵ, δ )-DP, where σ =
√
2 log(1.25/δ )/ϵ .
In Algorithm 3, д(i ) is divide into k sub-vectors {д(i )j }kj=1. Each
sub-vector д
(i )
j is clipped by a group-specific bound cj and the ran-
domnoise ξj ∼ N(0, (σcj )2I) is applied, whereσ =
√
2 log(1.25/δ )/ϵ .
Thus, releasing each д
(i )
j satisfies (ϵ, δ )-DP. As {д
(i )
j }kj=1 are dis-
joint, applying the parallel composability property of DP [10], re-
leasing {д(i )j }kj=1 also satisfies (ϵ, δ )-DP.

5 EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
In this section, we empirically evaluate the proposeddp-GAN frame-
work. The experiments are designed to answer four key questions
that impact dp-GAN’s practical use. First, is dp-GAN able to syn-
thesize visually vivid image data, under the DP constraint? Second,
does the synthesized data demonstrate sufficient quality and diver-
sity, from a quantitative perspective? Third, does the synthesized
data retain enough utility for concrete data analysis tasks? Finally,
how do different optimization strategies influence dp-GAN’s per-
formance? We begin with describing the experimental setting.
5.1 Experimental Setting
In our experiments, we use three benchmark datasets:
• MNIST, which consists of 70K handwritten digit images of size
28 × 28, split into 60K training and 10K test samples.
• CelebA, which comprises 200K celebrity face images of size
48 × 48, each with 40 attribute annotations.
Dataset α β1 β2 ϵ δ σ k twarm
MNIST 0.002 0.5 0.9 4 10−5 1.086 5 300
CelebA 0.002 0.0 0.9 10 10−5 0.543 6 800
LSUN-U 0.002 0.0 0.9 10 10−5 0.434 7 2400
LSUN-L 0.002 0.0 0.9 10 10−5 0.434 7 2000
Table 1: Parameter setting for each dataset.
• LSUN, which contains around one million labeled images of
size 64 × 64, for each of the 10 scene categories.
For the MNIST and CelebA datasets, we split the training data
(which is the entire dataset if no labeling information is considered)
using the ratio of 2 : 98 as publicly available dataDpub and private
data Dpri respectively. We train dp-GAN on Dpri under the DP
constraint. For the LSUN dataset, we consider two settings. First,
we consider it as an unlabeled dataset and split it into 2 : 98 as
public dataDpub and private dataDpri, which we denote as LSUN-
U. Second, we consider the label information of the dataset. We
sample 500K images from each of the top 5 categories (in terms of
number of images), which are then split into 2 : 98 as Dpub and
Dpri respectively. We refer to this dataset as LSUN-L.
The network architecture of dp-GAN is similar to [16], which
we adpat to each dataset. The default setting of the parameters is
as follows: the coefficient of gradient penalty λ = 10, the number
of critic iterations per GAN’s iteration ncritic = 4, the batch size
m = 64. The setting of the parameters specific to each dataset is
summarized in Table 1, where (α , β1, β2) are the hyper-parameters
of the Adam optimizer, (ϵ, δ ) are the privacy budget, and σ is the
noise scale. The setting of σ follows the setting in [1], which is
considered sufficiently strict in typical applications. The last two
hyper-parameters are for advanced dp-GAN: k is the number of
groups for weight clustering, and twarm is the number of iterations
for warm starting with public data.
All the experiments are conducted on TensorFlow.
5.2 Qualitative Evaluation
In this set of experiments, we qualitative evaluate the quality of
the data synthesized by dp-GAN. Figure 3, 4, 5, and 6 show a set of
synthetic samples generated by dp-GAN, which has been trained
on the MNIST, LSUN-U, LSUN-L, and CelebA datasets respectively.
It is noted that in all the cases, dp-GAN is able to generate visually
vivid images of quality comparable to original ones, while, at the
same time, providing strong privacy protection (see Table 1).
5.3 Quantitative Evaluation
Nextwe conduct quantitative evaluation ofdp-GAN’s performance.
Specifically, we first compare the synthetic data against the real
data in terms of their statistical properties, including Inception
scores and Jensen-Shannon divergence; we then evaluate the qual-
ity of the synthetic data in semi-supervised classification tasks.
Statistical Properties. In [32], Salimans et al. propose to use
Inception score to measure the quality of data generated by GAN.
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Figure 3: Synthetic samples for the MNIST dataset (ϵ = 4,δ ≤ 10−5)
Figure 4: Synthetic samples for LSUN-U dataset (ϵ = 10,δ ≤ 10−5)
Formally, the Inception score1 of a generator G is defined as:
s(G) = exp
(
Ex∼G(z)KL(Pr(y |x)| |Pr(y))
)
(4)
Here, (i) x is a sample generated byG. (ii) Pr(y |x) is the conditional
distribution imposed by a pre-trained classifier to predict x’s label
y. If x is similar to a real sample, we expect the entropy of Pr(y |x)
to be small. (iii) Pr(y) =
∫
x
Pr(y |x = G(z)dz is the marginal dis-
tribution of y. If G is able to generate a diverse set of samples, we
expect the entropy of Pr(y) to be large. Thus, by measuring the KL
divergence of the two distributions, s(G) captures both the qual-
ity and diversity of the synthetic data. For the MNIST and LSUN-L
datasets, we use the entire training set to train baseline classifiers
to estimate Pr(y |x). The classifiers are tuned to achieve reasonable
1Even though the datasets here are not ImageNet, we still refer to Eqn. 4 as Inception
score in the following.
performance on the validation sets (99.06% for MNIST and 88.73%
for LSUN-L).
Table 2 summarizes the Inception scores of synthetic data (gen-
erated by regular GAN and dp-GAN) and real data for the MNIST
and LSUN-L datasets. It can be noticed that dp-GAN is able to syn-
thesize data with Inception scores fairly close to the real data and
that generated by regular GANs (without privacy constraints). For
example, in the case of MNIST, the difference between the real data
and the synthetic data by dp-GAN is less than 1.32.
To measure dp-GAN’s performance with respect to unlabeled
data (e.g., CelebA and LSUN-U), we train another discriminator D′
using the real data and test whether D′ is able to discriminate the
synthetic data. We consider two distributions: (i) Pr(y |x) is the con-
ditional distribution that D′’s prediction about x’s source (real or
synthetic) and (ii) Bp is a Bernoulli distribution with p = 0.5. We
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Figure 5: Synthetic samples for the LSUN-L dataset (ϵ = 10,δ ≤ 10−5)
Figure 6: Synthetic samples for the CelebA dataset (ϵ = 10,δ ≤ 10−5)
Dataset Setting n (×106) (ϵ, δ ) Score
MNIST
real 0.06 - 9.96 ± 0.03
GAN 0.06 - 9.05 ± 0.03
dp-GAN 0.05 (4, 10−5) 8.64 ± 0.03
LSUN-L
real 2.50 - 4.16 ± 0.01
GAN 2.50 - 3.11 ± 0.01
dp-GAN 2.45 (10, 10−5) 2.78 ± 0.01
Table 2: Inception scores of real and synthetic data on the
MNIST and LSUN-L datasets (with label information).
use the Jensen-Shannon divergence of the two distributions tomea-
sure the quality of the synthetic data:
s(G) = 1
2
KL(Pr(y |x)| |Bp ) + 1
2
KL(Bp | |Pr(y |x))
Dataset Setting n (×106) (ϵ, δ ) Score
CelebA
real 0.22 - 0.00 ± 0.00
GAN 0.20 - 0.09 ± 0.00
dp-GAN 0.20 (10, 10−5) 0.28 ± 0.00
LSUN-U
real 2.50 - 0.00 ± 0.00
GAN 2.50 - 0.25 ± 0.00
dp-GAN 2.45 (10, 10−5) 0.29 ± 0.00
Table 3: Jensen-Shannon scores of real and synthetic data on
CelebA and LSUN-U datasets (without label information).
Intuitively, a smaller value of s(G) indicates that D′ has more dif-
ficulty to discriminate the synthetic data, i.e., better quality of the
data generated byG.8
Dataset Setting n (×106) (ϵ, δ ) Score
CelebA
real 0.22 - 0.00 ± 0.00
sync. (w/o DP) 0.20 - 0.09 ± 0.00
sync. (w/ DP) 0.20 (10, 10−5) 0.28 ± 0.00
LSUN-U
real 2.50 - 0.00 ± 0.00
sync. (w/o DP) 2.50 - 0.25 ± 0.00
sync. (w/ DP) 2.45 (10, 10−5) 0.29 ± 0.00
Table 4: Inception scores for generated examples and real
examples ON CelebA and LSUN–Bedroom.
Table 4 summarizes the quality scores of the real and synthetic
data (regular GANand dp-GAN) on the CelebA and LSUN-Udatasets.
Observe that dp-GAN generates data of quality close to that by reg-
ular GAN (without privacy constraints), especially in the case of
LSUN-U, i.e., 0.25 versus 0.29. This may be explained by that com-
pared with CelebA, LSUN-U is a relatively larger dataset, enabling
dp-GAN to better capture the underlying data distribution.
GANs that generate images with a single label or without a ex-
plicit classification task. We can consider train another discrimi-
nator D to produce a signal to identify if the images come from
generative distributionG (p (z)) (z ∼ p(z)) or real data distribution
pdata. We donate y = 1 if an image x comes from real distribution,
andy = −1 if it is a generated one. Here we use Jensen–Shannon di-
vergence tomeasure the distance between two distributions. Specif-
ically, we take
s(G) = 1
2
KL (p (y |x)‖q (y)) + 1
2
KL (q (y)‖p (y |x)) (5)
to measure the quality of generated examples without an explicit
supervised task. Herep (y |x) is the conditional probability of a sam-
ple x is coming from pdata, which is a Bernoulli distribution, and
q(y) is a Bernoulli distribution with parameter p = 0.5. Thus, the
better the generator, the smaller its score, as even a good discrimi-
nator is not able to decide if the sample x is coming from the gen-
eratorG or pdata. In table 4, we show the quality of scores of unla-
beled images with CelebA and LSUN–Bedroom datasets.
Analysis Tasks. We further evaluate dp-GAN’s performance
in concrete analysis tasks. Specifically, we consider the use of syn-
thetic data in a semi-supervised classification task. In such a task,
the analyst possesses a small amount of public, labeled data and a
large amount of synthetic, unlabeled data (generated by dp-GAN).
The goal is to leverage both the labeled and unlabeled data to train
a better classifier than that trained only using the limited labeled
data.
To make things more interesting, we consider the setting of two
separate classifiers. The first one C1 has the same structure as a
regular image classifier; while the second one C2 classifies using
both an image and its code. The architecture of C2 is designed
to learn the correlation between the codes and the images. The
learning procedure is sketched in Algorithm 4, it consists of two
part for each iteration. In the first part (line 2-5), we first sample a
batch ofm codes zˆ, and generate images zˆ from generator G with
zˆ, and use C1 to classify zˆ into category yˆ. Then we update C2 with
(zˆ, xˆ, yˆ) (line 5). In the second part (line 6-9), we sample a batch of
m · (1 − ps ) real examples (x,y) from the labeled data, and then
sample another batch ofm · ps codes zˆ and their synthetic images
zˆ, and labeled them with C2 as yˆ. Now we take both sets of inputs
to update C1.
We hope that C1 and C2 would converge quickly. However, In
the experiments, we found that if we use the data from C2 too early,
it would cause the entire model unstable, and difficult to converge
to a proper accuracy, due to that C2 is not fully trained with correct
labels (i.e., in early state, both C1 and C2 have low accuracy). Thus,
In practice, it is sensible to increase ps gradually during the train-
ing after some iterations. In our experiments, we first introduce
ps = 0 at the one third point of the regular model, and gradually
increase it to ps, final. Then we follow the flow in Algorithm 4 with
ps = ps, final.
Algorithm 4: Semi-Supervised Classification
Input:m - batch size; ps - percentage of synthetic data in
training; Gθ - privacy-preserving generator; Dpub -
public labeled dataset
Output: Cθ11 - image classifier; C
θ2
2 - image & code classifier
1 while Cθ11 or C
θ2
2 not converged yet do
// training C2
2 sample {zˆi }mi=1 ∼ pz ;
3 generate {xˆi }mi=1 withGθ and {zˆi }mi=1 ;
4 {yˆi }mi=1 ← C
θ1
1 ({xˆi }mi=1) ;
5 update C2 with (θ2, {(zˆi , xˆi , yˆi )}mi=1) ;
// training C1
6 sample {zˆi }m ·psi=1 ∼ pz ;
7 generate {xˆi }m ·psi=1 withGθ and {zˆi }
m ·ps
i=1 ;
8 {yˆi }m ·psi=1 ← C
θ1
2 ({(zˆi , xˆi )}
m ·ps
i=1 ) ;
9 sample {(xi ,yi )}m ·(1−ps )i=1 from Dpub ;
10 update C1 with
(
θ1, {(xˆi , yˆi )}m ·psi=1 , {(xi ,yi )}
m ·(1−ps )
i=1
)
;
11 return Cθ11 , C
θ2
2
We evaluate dp-GAN’s performance in such a task on the LSUN-
L dataset. It is clear that the semi-supervised classifier steadily out-
performs the supervised classifier. The difference is especially ev-
ident when the size of the public data is small (i.e., limited num-
ber of labeled samples). For example, for n = 0.5 × 104, the semi-
supervised classifier outperforms the supervised one by more than
6%.We can thus conclude that dp-GAN supplies valuable synthetic
data for such semi-supervised classification tasks.
5.4 Effectiveness of Optimizations
In the final set of experiments, we evaluate the impact of different
optimization strategies on dp-GAN’s performance.
We first measure the strategy of weight clustering on the num-
ber of allowed iterations given the same privacy constraints. Ta-
ble 7 compares the number of allowed iterations before and after
applying the weight clustering strategy. It is clear that across all
the datasets, this strategy significantly increases the number of al-
lowed iterations, thereby improving the retained utility in the gen-
erative models.
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Table 5: Semi-supervised Classification Task Result (LSUN-
L)
Setting n (×104) ps, final Original accuracy Semi accuracy
GAN
0.5 0.2 0.538 0.615
1.5 0.2 0.650 0.661
2.5 0.2 0.665 0.699
5.0 0.2 0.733 0.755
dp-GAN
0.5 0.2 0.538 0.571
1.5 0.2 0.650 0.669
2.5 0.2 0.665 0.695
5.0 0.2 0.733 0.737
We further measure the impact of different configures of multi-
ple optimization strategies on dp-GAN’s performance with results
listed in Table 9 and Table 10 for the labeled and unlabeled datasets
respectively. It is observed that in general, combining multi-fold
optimizations significantly boosts dp-GAN’s performance. For ex-
ample, in the case of Inception score, the score is increased from
6.59 to 8.64.
6 ADDITIONAL RELATED WORK
Recent research has suggested that it is possible to enforce strong
differential privacy protection in many types of analyses without
significant utility loss (see [9] for an excellent survey).
The existing work can be roughly categorized into supervised
settings, such as logistic regression [5] and support vectormachine (SVM) [5,
31], and unsupervised settings, such as publishing histograms [37],
releasing contingency tables [38], hypothesis testing [13], collabo-
rative recommendation [42], K-Means clustering [34], and spectral
graph analysis [35]. To our best knowledge, this work represents
one of the first attempts in the direction of differentially private
publishing of semantic-rich data.
More recently, extensive research effort has focused on enforc-
ing differential privacy in training deep learning models. Adadi
et al. [1] proposed to use differentially private stochastic gradient
descent [33] to enforce (ϵ, δ )-differential privacy in training deep
neural networks. Phan et al. [27], proposed to apply the functional
mechanism [40] to train differentially private auto-encoders. In
[25], Phan et al. proposed an adaptive Laplace mechanism to re-
duce the required random noise. Our work advances this line of
research by enforcing differential privacy in the setting of train-
ing generative adversarial networks, a new class of deep learning
models.
Theworkmost relevant to ours is perhaps [14], in whichGergely
et al. proposed a framework of training differential private deep
generative networks. Our work however differs from [14] in signif-
icant ways. First, [14] used a two-stage process that first performs
clustering and then produces generative models such as Restricted
BoltzmannMachine (RBM) [12] and Variational Auto-Encoder (VAE) [21];
in contrast, our work provides an end-to-end solution that pro-
duces general GAN, which is known to outperform RBM and VAE
in data synthesis. Second, the method in [12] only works well for
low-dimensional data (e.g., 784 for MNIST and 1303 for CDR); in
contrast, dp-GAN is able to generate high-quality, high-dimensional
synthetic data (e.g., 12,288 for LSUN). In [3], Jones et al. also pro-
posed a differentially private GAN framework, which however only
generates low-dimensional samples (3×12) andmeanwhile requires
label information. In comparison, dp-GAN works well for high-
dimensional datawithout any labeling information. To achieve this,
dp-GAN adoptsmultiple optimization strategies that improve both
training stability and utility retention.
7 CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
In this paper, we present dp-GAN, a generic framework of publish-
ing semantic-rich data in a privacy-preserving manner. Instead of
releasing sanitized datasets, dp-GAN releases differentially private
generative models, which can be used by analysts to synthesize un-
limited amount of data for arbitrary analysis tasks. To achieve this,
dp-GAN integrates the generative adversarial network framework
with differential privacy mechanisms, provides refined analysis of
privacy loss within this framework, and employs a suite of opti-
mization strategies to address the training stability and scalability
challenges. Using benchmark datasets and analysis tasks, we show
that dp-GAN is able to synthesize data of utility comparable to
original data, at the cost of modest privacy loss.
This work also opens several avenues for further research. For
example, in this paper we mostly focus on publishing image data,
while it is worth investigation to adapt dp-GAN to support other
types of semantic-rich data (e.g., LSTM for languagemodeling tasks).
In addition, dp-GAN is formulated as an unsupervised framework,
while its extension to supervised and semi-supervised learning is
attractive for data with label information.
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